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Abstract 
This article examines gendered aspects of women‘s lives in a hill village in 
central Nepal during the decade-long civil war (1996-2006). The predominantly middle 
aged and elderly women discussed in the paper were not directly influenced by Maoist 
equality agendas, nor have they been – as yet - significantly empowered by the recent 
post-conflict gender reservations. Rather, the paper argues that it was via the unintended 
consequences of the conflict - their unexpected leadership of a village development 
project – that these women forged an alternative path towards gender transformation. 
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Introduction 
The ‗People‘s War‘ (1996-2006) in Nepal presented the opportunity to create new 
(generally unanticipated) experiences for Nepali women of all backgrounds. This article 
examines gendered aspects of rural Tamu (aka Gurung)
3
 janajati (ethnic or ‗indigenous 
nationalities‘) women‘s lives in a hill village in central Nepal where, despite the 
involvement of some locals in the Maoist movement, the vast majority of people were 
non-aligned civilians.
 4
  The predominantly middle income and middle aged/elderly 
women in this paper were not directly influenced by the Maoist women they encountered, 
or by Maoist rhetoric, nor have they been significantly empowered – as yet - by the post 
2006 gender reservations. Rather, I argue that they forged an alternative path towards 
gender transformation through their unexpected leadership of a development project. 
These transformations resulted in part from learning to negotiate a precarious margin of 
safety between the government forces and Maoists insurgents during the conflict and by 
discovering that when thrown back on their own resources they could run (and expand) a 
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development project.  Thus their greater confidence in participating in public life is 
largely due to the unintended consequences of the conflict rather than Maoist gender 
equality rhetoric or post conflict state-sponsored equality policies. 
Much attention has been paid to the claimed 30-50% female participation in the 
Maoist ‗People‘s War‘ in Nepal. Although the exact percentage of women in the People‘s 
Liberation Army is contested (the Maoists state that up to about 30% to 50% of their 
force were women (Yami, 2007, p.6) while the United Nations Mission in Nepal 
(UNMIN) stated that women made up 19% of registered combatants (Whitfield 2010, 12) 
it is clear that the Maoists attracted considerable numbers of women to their cause. 
During the decade-long conflict, photographs of young insurgent women holding guns 
were prominently displayed in international Maoist publications and on the Communist 
Party of Nepal (Maoist), now the Unified Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist (UCPN-M) 
website. The aim of these images was apparently to provide evidence of the Maoist 
movement‘s empowerment of women. These representations could be contrasted to those 
which emerged out of the Kathmandu-based conflict resolution programmes which 
repeatedly portrayed village women at the mercy of both the Maoists and the state 
(Pettigrew and Shneiderman, 2004, p. 20). Contradictory narratives of agency and 
victimization are not new, and have often featured in feminist debate. The reality was 
somewhere between these extremes as most Nepali women were neither combatants nor 
dependent victims. . As Lauren Leve (2012: 180-181) states ―... we need to clearly 
understand that rural Nepali women are neither mute victims of socially oppressive 
traditions, nor naturally blessed with a revolutionary instinct.‖ Referring to women‘s 
agency she notes that women become themselves ―... through gendered physical and 
emotional engagements that often involved sacrifice and pain ... it‘s in the particular ways 
that each woman manages the dukkha [suffering] she is dealt that individuals exercise 
agency‖ (ibid, Desjarlais 2003). A key consideration of my article is the manner in which 
women in my research site exercised agency via their management of the contingencies, 
challenges and dukkha of the People‘s War. 
Only one point of the original 40 Maoist demands submitted to the government 
prior to the launch of the People‘s War explicitly refers to women while a second one 
relates directly to women‘s rights. Point 19 states that: ―Patriarchal exploitation and 
discrimination against women should be stopped. Daughters should be allowed access to 
paternal property‖ (cited in D. Thapa, 2003, p. 393). Nepali law historically prevented 
women from inheriting paternal property unless they were aged over 35 and unmarried. 
This legislation was amended in 2001 and came into effect in 2002 following a long 
campaign by Kathmandu‘s mainstream feminist organizations (M. Thapa 2003, p.53-54). 
In theory it grants equal property rights to women. Point 18 of the Maoist demands 
indirectly relates to women‘s rights,declaring ―Nepal should be declared a secular state‖ 
(cited D.Thapa, 2003,393). Senior female Maoist party leader Hisila Yami  makes it clear 
that ―Women‘s social oppression is firmly rooted in state sponsored Hindu religion which 
upholds feudal Brahminical rule based on caste system, which disparages women in 
relation to men‖ (Yami, 2007, p. 15). The reference to ―patriarchal exploitation and 
discrimination‖ and to the need for a secular state sums up the fact that in what was, until 
May 2006,
5
 the world‘s only official Hindu state, dominant (and frequently state-
supported) ideologies towards women were premised on conservative Hindu 
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understandings of femininity (Bennett, 1983). However, multi-ethnic Nepal has over 60 
non-Hindu groups who make up a substantial proportion of the population and who often 
pattern gender relations in very different ways to Hindu groups.  
Pettigrew and Shneiderman (2004, p. 23) point out one of the primary problems in 
Maoist attitudes towards women is that the underlying vision of ―Nepali women,‖ upon 
which Maoist claims of transformation were based, appears to be very similar to existing 
dominant discourses. Seira Tamang (2002) argues that the stereotypical image of a 
―universal Hindu Nepali woman,‖ who is oppressed and in need of empowerment, is the 
fictional product of a development discourse created by and for high-caste Hindus in 
Kathmandu. As she explains,  
 
―The patriarchically oppressed, uniformly disadvantaged and Hindu, 
‗Nepali woman‘ as a category did not pre-exist the development project. She 
had to be constructed by ignoring the heterogeneous forms of community, 
social relations, and gendered realities of the various peoples inhabiting 
Nepal‖ (Tamang, 2002, p.163).  
 
The Maoist movement is one of many social change projects that have occurred in 
Nepal. As Pettigrew & Shneiderman (2004, p. 8) point out, despite the Maoist critique of 
the Nepali state and foreign-funded development programs, they originate from and are 
embedded in the same context, and in many ways they uncritically appropriated the 
terminology and symbolic vocabulary of these institutions. For example, the Maoist 
rhetoric of ‗women‘s empowerment‘ appears to indicate an implicit acceptance of the 
idea of a universally disempowered Nepali woman. In contrast to this stereotypical image 
women from Nepal‘s non-Hindu and largely Tibeto-Burman language-speaking janajati 
groups have multiple opportunities for agency. While the representation of janajati 
communities as egalitarian is equally inaccurate —as there are many restrictions on the 
‗freedom‘ of janajati women —in many cases, they do have access to different forms of 
cultural, economic and symbolic power than caste-Hindu women (it is important to 
acknowledge that there is also diversity among Hindu groups). Furthermore, the gendered 
division of labour in these communities has traditionally been more flexible, with women 
engaging in heavy labour such as portering for cash wages and men often participating in 
household tasks such as cooking and cleaning. The multi-ethnic diversity of Nepal raises 
questions about the Maoist claim to have transformed social relations.  
aoist statements on gender relations have focused on overturning gendered 
hierarchies as part of their program for radical social transformation. However, as 
Pettigrew and Shneiderman (2004, p. 29) observe, the picture of Maoist attitudes towards 
gender relations that emerges is contradictory. Despite an ideological commitment to 
gender equality, criticisms about the gap between rhetoric and practice have been made 
many times both by outside commentators and also within the movement. Senior party 
leader Hisila Yami draws attention to the high number of women in the movement (and 
in senior positions) but is also critical of the party‘s gender record (Yami, 2007, p. 40). In 
2002-2003 the CPN-(M) conducted a survey of women who had been recruited during 
the war. The findings revealed that 74.56 per cent of those interviewed believed that 
gender discrimination was ‗normally present‘ in the movement and 3.66 per cent believed 
it to be ‗excessively present‘.  Significantly, 61.32 per cent of surveyed female members 
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who were members of the People‘s Liberation Army (PLA) believed that there was 
gender-based promotion discrimination in the Maoist army (Yami, 2007, p. 79). 
Despite the ongoing criticism, the Maoists have focused attention on women‘s 
empowerment in a manner that was missing from previous political discourse. Based on 
the work of feminist journalist Anju Chettri, (who in 2003 mapped out the way in which 
the Maoist demands for women‘s rights focused state attention, and even initiatives, on 
the rights of women) Seira Tamang (2009, p. 76) notes that in the 2001 peace talks, the 
CPN-(M) proposed that women be given rights in each sector and that the trafficking of 
women should be stopped. During the 2003 peace talks, the government negotiators 
stated that all oppression of women and trafficking must cease. Women were to given 
equal rights including inheritance. In the next round of talks, the states team‘s demands 
included, ―…25 per cent reservations in all institutions representing people; constitutional 
safeguards for the reservations for women in education, health, administration and 
employment; and at least 25 per cent representation in both houses‖ (cited in Tamang 
2009, p.76). Gagan Thapa, a youth leader of the Nepali Congress Party, commented on 
how the Maoists had forced the political parties to respond to women's issues and noted 
that ―The Maoists are making us travel in 10 years a path we would have travelled in 50‖ 
(Goering, 2008). 
In the aftermath of the April 2006 people‘s movement, which included large 
numbers of women, significant pressure was placed on the government to introduce 
reform. Commitments and laws followed including a declaration that Nepal is to be a 
secular federal democratic republic. Other laws included a new citizenship bill providing 
equal citizenship rights to mothers as well as fathers, a provision of 33% reservations for 
women in all state bodies and the passing of a bill on gender equality which allowed 
revisions in nineteen existing laws. Nepal adopted a mixed system to elect its Constituent 
Assembly members (tasked with drawing up a new constitution). Under the Proportional 
Representation voting system a 50 per cent women‘s quota was instigated (but not in the 
First-Past-the-Post system). Subsequently, 33 per cent of Nepal‘s Constituent Assembly 
were women (192 out of a total of 601). 
However, in spite of these achievements it is necessary to be cautious about 
assuming that there have been significant gains. As Tamang (2009, p. 77) points out, 
when a six member interim constitution-making team was constituted (just a week after 
the announcement of reservations for women in all state bodies) it did not initially 
include women (or Dalits – the former ‗untouchables‘ – or janajatis). Following protest, 
the numbers on the committee were increased and the composition became more 
inclusive, however, the additional members were chosen (by the parties) on the basis of 
party affiliations. Despite 33 per cent of the Constituent Assembly being female there 
was a clear lack of commitment on the part of the political parties during the 2008 
elections as none put forward 33 per cent female candidates in the First-Past-the-Post 
system. According to Tamang (2009), women who ran in the Constituent Assembly 
elections stated that women were given candidacies to fulfil quotas and they were not 
given the same degree of support as their male colleagues. Shanti Uprety (2012, 6) notes 
that women‘s effective participation in political parties in Nepal continues to be 
hampered by ―... pervasive male domination and masculine culture inside political 
parties‖. 
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These national-level transformations have to a greater or lesser extent impacted 
local contexts. For example, in my research site in a hill village in rural central Nepal I 
have observed the post 2006 adherence to filling quotas for women on local committees. 
Women‘s participation in local politics is new, but not entirely, as there have always been 
small numbers of women active in public life in Tamu villages. Rather, it can be seen to 
be an extension of pre-existing practice and not a completely new departure. For 
example, when I began my research in the early 1990s, one of the most prominent 
members of the VDC, Prem Kumari, was an unmarried middle aged woman. Women like 
Prem Kumari, however, often belonged to elite families with a long history of leadership, 
whereas today the engagement of women on village committees has widened to also 
include those from a range of socio-economic backgrounds. However, when questioned 
about the extent and depth of change women state that although they are present the 
number of women in key decision making positions is limited. Most of the senior 
positions on the village committees are still held by men. Despite their inclusion women 
feel that  the patriarchal structures continue to limit their influence. The People‘s War 
presented the opportunity to create new (generally unanticipated) experiences for Nepali 
women of all backgrounds.  The transformation in gendered roles and relations is due to 
the space opened by the conflict, and, as I show below, the fundamental shifts in 
women‘s participation in public life in the village of Kwei Nasa6  may have occurred less 
because of planned political policies and more because of the unintended consequences 
of the conflict that emerged regarding women‘s existing practices.  
 
The ‘People’s War’ 
In February 1996 the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (hereafter CPN (M)) 
submitted a 40-point list of demands to the Nepal government. When these demands were 
not addressed, the CPN (M) escalated its underground war. From their original 
strongholds in the mid-Western part of the country, the Maoists started to establish ―base 
areas‖ elsewhere. Early on, repressive police responses antagonized local people and 
garnered support for the insurgents (D. Thapa, 2001). The Maoists also took advantage of 
widespread frustration with an unreliable and corrupt state, which despite promises of 
enfranchisement and economic development after the establishment of democracy in 
1990 had provided little concrete improvement. The conflict escalated in November 
2001, when the insurgents withdrew from a ceasefire and initiated a series of attacks 
across the country including ones targeted for the first time at Royal Nepal Army 
barracks. In response, King Gyanendra imposed a State of Emergency which effectively 
suspended most civil rights and for the first time deployed the army to fight the Maoists. 
In January 2003 a second ceasefire was called and a schedule for peace talks was 
established. Ultimately the talks broke down in late summer 2003 and 1000 people were 
killed in the following four months. In 2003 and 2004, Nepal had the highest number of 
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disappearances in the world (United Nations, 2004). Human rights organisations 
extensively documented the human rights violations committed by both the Maoists and 
state forces (Amnesty, 2002; Amnesty,2003; Human Rights Watch, 2004; Advocacy 
Forum, 2010), during the insurgency. 
King Gyanendra took power directly in February 2005 and declared a State of 
Emergency. He suspended key constitutional rights, placed leading politicians under 
house arrest and ordered the army to enforce media censorship. Communications links 
between Nepal and the outside world were briefly cut. In November 2005 the Maoists and 
seven mainstream political parties agreed on a program intended to restore democracy. The 
jan andolan (People‘s Movement) of April 2006, which saw the political parties and the 
Maoists collaborating, led to the king relinquishing power.  A ceasefire was negotiated, 
followed in November 2006 by a peace accord signed by the government and the Maoists 
declaring a formal end to the ten-year insurgency which had cost the lives of more than 
14,000 people. In January 2007 the Maoists entered parliament under the terms of a 
temporary constitution. The Peace Agreement included plans for election to a Constituent 
Assembly (which was tasked with writing a new constitution) and the monitoring of the 
weapons and soldiers of the People's Liberation Army by the UN. Subsequently, just 
under 20,000 PLA soldiers were restricted to United Nations controlled cantonments 
across the country. Insisting on the abolition of the monarchy, the Maoists withdrew from 
the government in September 2007 and did not re-enter until December 2007 when 
parliament agreed to this condition. Elections for the Constituent Assembly (which were 
twice rescheduled) were held in April 2008. The Maoists won a spectacular election victory, 
gaining the highest number of seats in the new Constituent Assembly, although with 220 out 
of 601 seats, they did not secure a majority. Despite a series of extensions the Constituent 
Assembly did not complete its task of writing the constitution by the deadline of May 2012 
and so collapsed. Elections have been proposed for the end of 2012. 
 
Kwei Nasa  
Kwei Nasa is a village of several hundred households located along the upper 
slopes and top of a ridge in the Himalayan foothills in central Nepal. It has a health post, 
rice mill, post office and teashops that serve as general-purpose stores. It was the last 
village in the area to become electrified  in 2010. Although most villagers are Tamu, 
Kwei Nasa is a mixed community that includes Dalits, (Blacksmith and Tailor castes)
 7
 
and in nearby hamlets Bahuns (hill Brahmins), and Chettris (both caste Hindu groups). 
The primary occupation is farming and the staple crop is rice, but maize and millet are 
also grown. Stretching below the village on either side of the ridge are the steeply 
terraced fields, some close to the village but others up to an hours walk away. 
Agricultural work involves steep climbs and descents and long walks with heavy loads. 
Both men and women undertake this extremely strenuous work. Women are also 
responsible for  running  households and play the major role in food preparation and 
childcare. Most consumer goods that people use come from the town. Vegetables sellers 
visit each week and other merchants come less regularly to sell dry goods, glass bangles, 
and sundry items. In the winter months traders from the north sell herbs and turquoise 
and coral beads. For everything else people make shopping trips to the urban center 
which is less than a day‘s walk away.  
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 Formerly considered to be ‗untouchable‘. 
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Out-migration of young people, especially men, from this area has a long history. 
Many villagers have relatives working overseas and remittances make a significant 
contribution to the local economy. Kwei Nasa, like other Tamu villages, has a lengthy 
tradition of male recruitment in foreign armies and every family has army links. Although 
the numbers serving in the Gurkha regiment of the British Army are now relatively small, 
higher numbers serve in the Indian Army and a small number serve in the Royal Nepal 
Army. Significant numbers of men (and increasingly women) also work overseas in the 
Gulf, and Southeast Asia. Due to the lengthy history of male out-migration Tamu women 
have long headed households, run farms and brought up children alone. The conflict-
related changes which have been noted elsewhere as radical departures in women‘s 
practices (such as heading households and running farms) were therefore of much less 
impact in Tamu villages. 
 
The People’s War in Kwei Nasa 
Armed Maoists first appeared in Kwei Nasain the late 1990s. Initially their visits 
were infrequent and included cultural performances, speeches, and requests for financial 
donations and guns. Their presence increased when a training camp opened in the forest 
above a neighbouring village. A villager recalled that it was common for the insurgents to 
come into Kwei Nasa en route to the camp and to see porters ferrying foodstuffs and 
equipment. On one occasion, a Maoist leader showed a Village Development Committee 
(VDC - the lowest level of local government) member the guns they had captured from 
the police and boasted that they would capture many more.  
On a spring morning in 2000 standing in my village ‗sister‘s‘ courtyard looking 
over the familiar village landscape I heard what I thought was the sound of a gunshot.  
When I told Dhan Kumari, she asked me a series of detailed questions, ―Where did the 
shot come from?‖  ―How many shots did you hear?‖  ―Are you sure it was a gun?‖8  I was 
not, but it was some time before she was satisfied that I had made a mistake.  Previously, 
a comment like this would have triggered minimal curiosity and would have been 
dismissed as, ―Just someone hunting in the forest‖.  Surprisingly, however, Dhan Kumari 
appeared to be frightened.  ―What are you frightened of?‖ I asked.  She was quiet for a 
while and then replied, ―I am frightened of the Maoists.‖9 An unmarried middle-aged 
woman, Dhan Kumari lived alone although a young female relative, Dil Maya, and her 
son, Raju, spend much of the time in her large family home. When I asked her if locals 
were involved she acknowledged that there were Maoist activists in the area, particularly 
in some of the surrounding hamlets where there are families with long histories of left-
wing political activism. Dhan Kumari was frightened because she was well off and 
owned a large amount of land, which was sharecropped, a practice that she had recently 
heard the Maoists disapproved of. As a well-resourced villager she was vulnerable to 
being asked by the Maoists for large monetary ‗donations‘ and as a householder she was 
vulnerable to ongoing requests for food and accommodation. 
The middle-aged and elderly mainly female middle-income villagers I talked to in 
2000 viewed the Maoists as a threat. For those who were better resourced the threat was 
greater. People with large houses, guns, money, and gold were more at risk than poorer 
less well-resourced ones.  ‗Maoists‘ were a shifting expanding category, which included 
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 (personal communication March 2000) 
9
 (personal communication March 2000) 
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the insurgents and a puzzling mixture of others who posed as Maoists but were in fact 
thieves.  I frequently heard people say, ―While Maoists want money and guns they speak 
politely and explain their ideas and their activities whereas the others just want money.‖  
‗Fear of Maoists‘ also included what could be done in the name of the Maoist movement 
and people worried that those with whom they had contentious relationships might exact 
revenge through violence. When I asked people why they were frightened of the Maoists, 
they told me that it was because ―people have died.‖ What was also shocking and 
unexpected to them was that locals, including young women, were involved with the 
Maoists.  When Maoists entered a friend‘s village, the enduring images that she and her 
relatives emphasized were those concerning the membership of the group and their 
behaviour.  They were people they knew, young women with guns who threatened them 
with death should they reveal their identities to the security forces.  My friend explained 
that while losing a gun and some money was very distressing and the threat of death even 
more so, the social and kinship implications of this encounter were deeply shocking.  In 
this brief exchange, accepted notions of social relationships, based on a relatively orderly 
progression of age overlaid with ideas of gender-appropriate behaviour, were completely 
undermined. 
By the end of 2001 the insurgency had escalated and the Maoists, now an 
outlawed underground movement, changed their relationship with the village. As their 
camps became targets for army raids and bombings they moved out of the forests and 
into the villages requesting food and shelter almost every day. This changed pattern 
impinged on householder women‘s daily activities and placed their homes at risk. No 
longer able to operate openly the insurgents movements became clandestine and their 
arrival and departure - although primarily timed for late in the afternoon or early in the 
morning - less predictable. Villagers‘ fears were realised as the deployment of the army 
meant that their homes were a target when the Maoists were present and after they left. 
The security forces visited relatively rarely but they were deeply feared as they were 
perceived to be ―trigger happy,‖ aloof and authoritarian and unlike the Maoists it was not 
possible to negotiate with them. The best strategy for dealing with the security forces was 
to have as little to do with them as possible. With the escalation of the conflict Maoist 
influence increased and through the threat of physical violence or actual violence they 
forced the Village Development Committee (VDC) to discontinue their work. The only 
Nepal government representatives remaining in the village were the health workers and 
the teachers and both groups came under scrutiny and pressure. With the dismantling, or 
partial dismantling, of the institutions of the state, the Maoist parallel administration 
became more influential. Used to administrations that exerted limited or minimal 
influence, the villagers found themselves under a shadowy regime characterised by 
random and unclear policies enforced by violence or the threat of violence. To complicate 
matters this Maoist administration had only partial control as the village remained 
officially under the remit of the Nepal government the representatives of which, the 
security forces, could appear at any moment to search for Maoists and scrutinise villagers 
for signs of collaboration.  
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During the People‘s War the activities of development projects were closely 
scrutinized (and in some cases prohibited) by the Maoists who accused them of 
collaborating with  elites and ignoring the most marginalized and impoverished sections 
of society.
10
 A high profile Nepali NGO had opened a project office in Kwei Nasa in 
1999 and initiated various development and resource conservation initiatives in the 
village including the opening of a day care center. The center had places for 25 children 
up to the age of five (children go to primary school in Nepal when they are five) and was 
immediately very popular as it provided pre-schooling and offered a safe place for 
parents (especially women) to leave their young children while engaged in field and 
forest work.  The project paid the teachers and funded the center. A committee of village 
women was formed to run the center on a day-to-day basis. All the committee members 
were members of one of the four village Mother‘s Groups (the leading women‘s 
organisation in the village which among other things aims to support and empower local 
women). Mother‘s Groups raise funds (mainly by hosting dances for visitors) to repair 
and develop village infrastructure (such as the repair of paths) and undertake other small 
projects. Some members also participate in rotating credit schemes which provide loans 
to women. 
 
By the summer of 2002 the project was targeted by the Maoists because it was 
under the auspices of a wildlife trust which had royal patronage. It was becoming 
increasingly hard for the workers to continue their activities and shortly afterwards the 
threatened staff had to leave their posts. In late 2002 the People‘s Liberation Army 
ransacked the project headquarters in another village and one evening in December they 
wrecked the office in Kwei Nasa. They threw all the furniture outside, ripped up the 
plastic sheets covering the seedlings and destroyed the horticultural nursery. Dhan 
Kumari explained what happened, 
 
―Some of us women were very upset, as the project helped us do 
many things - like starting the day care center. Purna Maya and Sanu Maya 
wept as they were so upset. I was angry and when I asked the Maoists [who 
were staying in her house] ... why they had done such a bad thing they said, 
―We didn‘t do it Mother, we weren‘t involved, others did it‖. After that we 
heard that they were planning to destroy the day care center as it had a project 
board nailed to the outside. I went out on the street along with some of the 
other women from the committee. We pleaded with them not wreck it. We 
explained that we just received some support from the project but it was our 
day care and we had built it and we run it. They removed the board [with the 
development project‘s name on it] but left the center alone.11‖  
 
                                                 
10
 International development agencies were viewed by the Maoists as representatives of imperialism and a 
vehicle via which foreign governments could position themselves within the political and development 
arena of Nepal. 
11
 (personal communication March 2003). 
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By coming out onto the streets after dark (a rare occurrence during the conflict) 
the women saved the day care center. In contrast to their common portrayal of themselves 
as agency-less in the face of the combatants the women drew on a range of strategies 
including confrontation and negotiation to achieve their goal of ensuring that the center 
was not destroyed. Their response to this threat was based on anger and a sense of 
injustice which they expressed through collective action. When questioned further they 
reiterated the importance of the day care center to their everyday lives, their reliance on it 
to manage child care and their sense of achievement in operating it (albeit at that time 
with quite a lot of support from the development project). Experience had also shown that 
it was possible – if you were cautious - to negotiate with the Maoists. Some women 
explained that the insurgents were rural people like them, who knew the ways and 
problems of the village. Long-term proximity and observation enabled women to identify 
the most appropriate negotiation strategies to use which they deployed as strategically as 
possible. Aware of the importance of the day care center to the women and perhaps 
unwilling to anger those on whom they were dependent for food and shelter, the Maoists 
backed down. 
The women then took over the management of the center. Initially they received 
occasional secret visits from the project workers and then when it became too dangerous 
for them to visit they ran the center on their own with sporadic phone consultation from 
the project. In 2000 they had asked me to provide some support and on each visit I 
brought a small amount of money which I had raised outside the country. Subsequently, 
the Maoist commander banned meetings held by the committees which had been formed 
by the discredited development project.  This included conservation committees and 
various other development committees such as the day care center committee. The 
committees were disbanded, he stated, and the members were forced to resign. This made 
the management of the day care center and other development activities, such as 
conservation of the forest, more complicated. The commander stated that things could be 
run ―in the traditional manner‖, leaving it up to locals to interpret this. No one was sure 
what exactly this meant; but it seemed that while ad hoc ‗committee‘ meetings could be 
held, the bureaucracy relating to the formal committees, such as minute taking, official 
scheduling of meetings in designated buildings etc. was to cease. On one occasion I 
attended a meeting to decide the fate of a man who had burnt down his brother‘s house 
which was held under a tree in order to appear ―traditional‖. Shortly after the 
commanders order, the day care center committee secretly held their formal monthly 
meeting inside a locked house, but became so frightened that they decided to comply 
with the ruling. The committee members wrote the required resignation letters to the 
development project; but the project did not accept them. This ambiguity enabled 
villagers to meet the Maoists demands yet retain their links with the project. It also 
provided a measure of protection, as it deflected the blame for lack of compliance away 
from the villagers and onto the absent development project. Equally ambiguous was the 
financial management of the day care center. Officially, it was a village project, yet it 
remained funded primarily by the development project and everyone, including the 
commander, knew this. As long as this was not openly acknowledged, the deception was 
ignored. 
In 2005, I was contacted by an international trust which funds small-scale 
development projects. They had become aware of the day care center and stated that they 
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would welcome an application to provide some support. The committee decided to apply 
for funds to open a child health clinic in the grounds of the day care center and employ a 
second teacher and a helper at the day care center. The first request was especially 
important as some of the government health post workers had fallen foul of the Maoists 
and consequently the Health Post was severally short staffed (and remained so until well 
after the conflict ended). During one of my visits an outbreak of conjunctivitis among 
village children was only treated after a lengthy delay because medicine had to be sent up 
from the town. Funding was approved and the committee members then applied to the 
‗government‘ (the Maoists) for permission to build it. My suggestion to also seek 
permission from the Nepal government was met with amusement from some women who 
pointed that ―that government have not been seen for years‖.12 Eventually Dhan Kumari 
and Purna Maya negotiated with the Maoist commander and received permission to build 
the clinic. Rather than requesting a formal meeting which he might or might not attend 
they decided to approach him informally and so they put their request to him when he 
was sitting casually at teashop. This approach worked and he gave approval. There were 
conditions, however: no American money was to be used (the US provided military 
assistance - i.e. assault rifles - to the government forces) nor was funding to come from 
an official aid agency or national institution, and the project was to be sustainable and 
transparent. The fact that the day care center provided access (including scholarships) to 
the most marginalised and impoverished in the community was a significant factor in 
allowing it to continue running (when many projects had been closed down) and to 
expand.  Sourcing local labour and in conjunction with the chair of the conservation 
committee the women arranged for the building to be built. By the end of the year the 
clinic was almost complete and plans were underway to employ a health worker. 
In April 2006 following a successful People‘s Movement, King Gyanendra 
relinquished power. A ceasefire came into force in June 2006 and in November of that 
year the government and the Maoists signed a peace accord. By 2007 the day care center 
project had grown into a health and educational project which incorporates a community 
library as well as the child clinic and the day care center. It employs nine people 
including the first Dalit (formerly ‗untouchable‘) woman in employment in a public 
institution in the village. In early 2009 it was formally registered as the Dhi Project, an 
official NGO registered by the Nepal government. Its steering committee includes people 
from a variety of backgrounds and political parties including the Maoists. Purna Maya is 
the president and with one exception all its most senior post holders are women. The Dhi 
Project is run by the women who at the beginning of the insurgency felt unsure of their 
abilities to manage such an undertaking or to take lead positions in public life. They 
saved it from Maoist threat and having done so they successfully ran and expanded it and 
in doing so they surprised themselves. As Purna Maya, explained: ―We can do things that 
before we thought only men could do.  We can organise, run committees and lead just as 
well as the men‖13 . These achievements have led them to expand the main Mother‘s 
Group meeting house in the village. They applied for a series of grants and also 
undertook substantial fundraising in order to build what is now the most impressive 
public building in Kwei Nasa.  
 
                                                 
12
 (personal communication 2005). 
13
 (personal communication January 2009). 
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Conclusion 
Women in Kwei Nasa participate in greater numbers today on village 
development and political committees facilitated in part by government instigated quotas. 
This is not entirely new as there have always been small numbers of women active in 
public life in Tamu villages. When asked about the greater involvement of women in 
public life, Dhi Project president Purna Maya acknowledges the role of political change 
in enhancing women‘s involvement but points out the continued barriers to participation 
due to unchanged patriarchal attitudes. Women may be present – and that‘s a good thing, 
she says, as it brings possibilities for more influence and the development of greater 
opportunities for women - but on many committees women are marginal to the decision 
making process. The composition may have changed but the male dominated channels of 
power and influence are largely unchanged. Continuing, she points out the widespread 
endurance of attitudes that diminish women‘s opportunities. For example,  
 
―Many girls would like to get a college education but their parents don‘t 
send them as they expect them to get married and instead they send their 
sons. Some things have changed, but lots of things have not and they 
won‘t until people‘s ideas about women change14‖ 
 
Like women engaged in national political parties women in Kwei Nasa welcome 
greater opportunities for inclusion but they are also cautious about being too optimistic. 
Quotas to enhance women‘s participation in public life have only been used in Kwei 
Nasa in the last few years and it will take time to assess their impact. To date,  however, 
the most influential factors in their increased confidence in public life have been gained 
unexpectedly by their experiences and success of managing - contrary to general trends - 
the day-to-day challenges and contingencies of a development project during the People‘s 
War. Provided with the opportunity to open a child clinic they readily took up the 
challenge and strategizing carefully gained the approval of the Maoist commander for 
their new venture. Clearly these women are not the passive victims that the dominant 
development discourse presents them to be, neither, however, are they the newly 
empowered agents according to Maoist gender rhetoric. It was not the ideals of formal 
equality agendas –- that enabled these women to more fully act in the public realm - 
although they may facilitate their expanded participation in the future - but rather what 
they learnt via the unexpected challenges and contingencies of the People‘s War. 
Through a series of unintended eventualities these Kwei Nasa women have experienced 
potentially transformative possibilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 (personal communication June 2012) 
 
  
112 
Journal of International Women‘s Studies Vol 13 #4 September 2012 
References 
Advocacy Forum (2011) Exhumations of Bodies of the Disappeared – in Need of a Policy 
Framework, Kathmandu: Advocacy Forum. Retrieved March 5, 2012 from 
http://www.advocacyforum.org/downloads/pdf/publications/impunity/exhumation
-of-bodies-of-the-disappeared-english.pdf 
Amnesty International (2002, December 19) Nepal: a Deepening Human Rights Crisis: 
Time for International Action, London: Amnesty International. Retrieved July 6, 
2012 from http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA31/072/2002 
Amnesty International (2003, October 15) Nepal: Widespread “Disappearances” in the 
Context of Armed Conflict, London: Amnesty International. Retrieved July 6, 
2012 from http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA31/045/2003/en 
Bennett, L. (1983) Dangerous Wives and Sacred Sisters: Social and Symbolic Roles of 
High Caste Women in Nepal, New York: Columbia University Press. 
Desjarlais, R. (2003) Sensory Biographies: Lives and Deaths Among Nepal’s Yolmo 
Buddhists, Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Goering, L. (2008, January 24) Women put on hold in Nepal. Chicago Tribune [online], , 
Retrieved July 9, 2012 from http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2008-01-
24/news/0801240080_1_maoist-nepali-congress-rural-areas  
Human Rights Watch (2004) Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Civilians Struggle to 
Survive in Nepal’s Civil War, 16(12c). 
Leve, L.G. (2012) Women‘s empowerment and rural revolution: rethinking ―failed 
development‖. In A. Shah & J. Pettigrew (Eds.) Windows into a Revolution: 
Ethnographies of Maoism in India and Nepal. (pp. 160-184). New Delhi: Social 
Science Press. 
Pettigrew, J. & Shneiderman, S. (2004) Women and the Maobaadi: ideology and agency 
in Nepal‘s Maoist movement, Himal South Asian, 17(1), 19-29. 
Tamang, S. (2002) The politics of ‗developing Nepali women‘. In K. M. Dixit & S. 
Ramachandran (Eds.) State of Nepal. (pp. 161-175). Kathmandu: Himal Books. 
Tamang, S. (2009) The politics of conflict and difference or the difference of conflict in 
politics: the women‘s movement in Nepal, Feminist Review, 91(1), 61-80. 
Thapa, D. (2001) Day of the Maoist. Himal South Asian, 14(5), 4-21. 
Thapa, D. (Ed.). (2003) Understanding the Maoist Movement of Nepal, Kathmandu: 
Martin Chautari. 
Thapa, M. (2003) Girls in Nepal‘s Maoist war. Himal South Asian, 16(6), 49-55. 
Uprety, S. (2012) Exploring the Prevalence of Masculinities in the Functioning of 
Political Parties in Nepal, SANAM Fellowship Program 2010. Retrieved July 23, 
2012 from 
http://www.engagingmen.net/files/resources/2012/lbelbase/Nepal_Shanti_Explori
ng_the_Prevalence_of_Masculinities_in_the_Functioning_of_Political_Parties_in
_Nepal_0.pdf 
Whitfield, T. (2010) Focused Mission: Not So Limited Duration: Identifying Lessons 
from the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN), New York: New York 
University. Retrieved July 23, 2012 from 
http://www.cic.nyu.edu/staff/docs/whitfield/whitfield_focusedmission.pdf 
Yami, H. (2007) People’s War and Women’s Liberation in Nepal, Kathmandu: 
Janadhwani Publication. 
